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Abstract
Simultaneous dense coding guarantees that Bob and Charlie simultaneously receive their respec-
tive information from Alice in their respective processes of dense coding. The idea is to use the
so-called locking operation to “lock” the entanglement channels, thus requiring a joint unlocking
operation by Bob and Charlie in order to simultaneously obtain the information sent by Alice. We
present some new results on simultaneous dense coding: (1) We propose three simultaneous dense
coding protocols, which use different N-dimensional entanglement (Bell state, W state and GHZ
state). (2) Besides the quantum Fourier transform, two new locking operators are introduced (the
double controlled-NOT operator and the SWAP operator). (3) In the case that spatially distant Bob
and Charlie have to finalise the protocol by implementing the unlocking operation through commu-
nication, we improve our protocol’s fairness, with respect to Bob and Charlie, by implementing the
unlocking operation in series of steps. (4) We improve the security of simultaneous dense coding
against the intercept-resend attack. (5) We show that simultaneous dense coding can be used to im-
plement a fair contract signing protocol. (6) We also show that the N-dimensional quantum Fourier
transform can act as the locking operator in simultaneous teleportation of N-level quantum systems.
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1 Introduction
Due to the Holevo bound [1], at most log2N bits of information can be transmitted via a quN it (N -level
quantum system). Dense coding, proposed by Bennett and Wiesner [2] in 1992, increases the classical
capacity of a quantum communication channel with the help of prior entanglement [3]. If the sender and
the receiver share a pair of entangled quN its, 2 log2N bits can be transmitted via a quN it [2].
In the simplest case of dense coding two parties, Alice and Bob, share a pair of entangled qubits (2-
level quantum systems) in a Bell state. Alice first performs one of the four local unitary operations I, σx,
iσy and σz (where σj are the Pauli matrices) on her qubit to encode 2 bits of information, transforming
the entangled pair into one of the four mutually orthogonal Bell states. Then Alice sends her qubit to
Bob through a quantum channel. Bob is now able to measure both qubits in the Bell basis to obtain
one of the four possible outcomes correlated with the operations performed by Alice. Thus, Alice can
transmit 2 bits of information to Bob by manipulating and sending only one qubit.
Thus far, dense coding has been extensively studied in various ways. For example, dense coding
that utilises high-dimensional entangled states has been studied in [4, 5, 6], non-maximally entanglement
channels in [7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19], while multipartite entanglement channels
have also been considered in [20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27]. Another generalisation is to perform the
communication task under the control of a third party, so-called controlled dense coding [28, 29, 30, 31].
Inspired by the simultaneous teleportation scheme proposed by Wang et al [32], we have proposed
a simultaneous dense coding (SDC) scheme [33], which guarantees that Bob and Charlie (the receivers)
simultaneously receive their respective information from Alice (the sender) in their respective processes
of dense coding. In this scheme, Alice first performs a locking operation to entangle the particles from
two independent quantum entanglement channels, and therefore the receivers cannot obtain their respec-
tive information separately, before performing the unlocking operation together. The quantum Fourier
transform and its inverse are used as the locking and unlocking operators, respectively.
Simultaneous dense coding may be relevant and useful in various applications in which Bob and Charlie
can be either close or separated. If Alice has two different secrets, one for Bob and another for Charlie,
she can utilise simultaneous dense coding to guarantee that Bob and Charlie simultaneously reveal their
respective secrets. Bob does not know Charlie’s secret and vice versa. For example, boss wants two
employees to simultaneously carry out two confidential commercial activities under the condition that
the sensitive information of each activity is only revealed to whom is in charge of that activity.
There are other applications improving some models or tasks of quantum communication. In Sec. 5,
we show that simultaneous dense coding can be used to implement a fair contract signing protocol [34]
between spatially distant Bob and Charlie. In this case, Bob and Charlie are separated so that there is
a problem of how to implement the unlocking operation fairly. We discuss this problem in Sec.3.
In this paper, we give some new results on simultaneous dense coding and teleportation. The main
improvements over earlier proposals are: (i) introduction of new locking operations (the double-controlled-
NOT and the SWAP operators) for SDC schemes that were not used before, showing that the protocol can
be achieved by using three different N -dimensional quantum states (Bell, W and GHZ states) that were
not mentioned in that context in the literature before; (ii) designing a strategy which achieves the fairness
of SDC, allowing for the protocol to be performed even when mutually mistrustful Bob and Charlie are
situated on spatially distant locations, a feature which previous SDC proposals do not allow; (iii) designing
a strategy which also achieves the security of SDC against intercept-resend attack, improving the security
of SDC over the previous proposals; (iv) introducing simultaneous teleportation scheme for the transfer of
arbitrary number of N -level quantum states. In addition to that, we proposed contract signing protocol
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based on a fair and secure SDC protocol. Having more options for achieving simultaneous transmission of
(densely coded) information presents opportunities for designing SDC protocols with improved security
features, and in addition provides wider range of possibly suitable experimental realisations. Indeed,
achieving the fairness of SDC scheme, a feature not satisfied by previous SDC proposals, is only possible
with the double-controlled-NOT and the SWAP locking operator. Also, the security of the protocol
against intercept-resend attack is a novel feature of SDC schemes introduced in our paper.
The paper is organised as follows. In Sec. 2, we introduce the locking operators (i.e. the quantum
Fourier transform, the double controlled-NOT operator and the SWAP operator) and propose three
simultaneous dense coding protocols utilising different N -dimensional quantum states (i.e., Bell states,
W states, and GHZ states). In Sec. 3, we improve the fairness of the protocol by implementing the
unlocking operation between spatially distant Bob and Charlie. In Sec. 4, we improve the security of
simultaneous dense coding against the intercept-resend attack. In Sec. 5, we show that simultaneous
dense coding can be used to implement a fair contract signing protocol. In Sec. 6, we show that the
N -dimensional quantum Fourier transform can act as the locking operator in simultaneous teleportation
of quN its. A brief conclusion follows in Sec. 7.
2 N-dimensional simultaneous dense coding
A quN it is anN -dimensional quantum system. States ofN -dimensional quantum systems can be mapped
onto n = log2(N) qubits, and throughout the paper we will assume that a quN it is realised as an ordered
array of qubits. We also assume that the dimension N of quN its satisfies the requirement N = 2n, with
n ∈ N. In other words, one quN it consists of (or can be mapped to) n qubits.
In the task of N -dimensional simultaneous dense coding (SDC), Alice intends to use dense coding
to send two cN its (arrays of classical bits) b1, b2 ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N − 1} to Bob and two cN its c1, c2 ∈
{0, 1, . . . , N−1} to Charlie, under the condition that Bob and Charlie must collaborate to simultaneously
find out what she sends.
In the following subsections, we propose three protocols, one usingN -dimensional Bell states, the other
using W states, and the third using GHZ states, as the entanglement channels, respectively. The idea
behind these protocols is to perform the locking operator on Alice’s quN its before sending them to Bob
and Charlie. After receiving Alice’s quN its, the states of Bob’s subsystem and Charlie’s subsystem are
independent of (b1, b2) and (c1, c2), respectively, so that they know nothing about the encoded information.
Only after performing the unlocking operator (the inverse of the locking operator) together, Bob and
Charlie can obtain (b1, b2) and (c1, c2), respectively.
In this section, we assume that Bob and Charlie are at the same site. In order to implement the
unlocking operator, they can input their particles into a physical device that can unlock the particles,
and then get their respective output particles. The problem of how distant Bob and Charlie can perform
the unlocking operator fairly is discussed in Sec. 3.
2.1 DCNOT locking operator
Before introducing the protocols, let us first have a look at the DCNOT (double controlled-NOT) operator,
which is used as the locking operator. The DCNOT operator is composed of two CNOT (controlled-NOT)
operators. The CNOT operator has two input qubits. If the first qubit (the control qubit) is in state
|1〉, CNOT flips the state of the second qubit (the target qubit). If the control qubit is in state |0〉,
CNOT does nothing to the target qubit (|0〉 and |1〉 are the basis vectors). Its action can be described
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as (x, y = 0, 1 are bit values):
|x〉|y〉 → |x〉|x ⊕ y〉, (1)
where ⊕ denotes bitwise addition modulo 2.
The DCNOT operator is formed by performing the first CNOT with the first qubit as the control and
the second being the target, and then a second CNOT with inverse roles of the qubits (the first qubit as
the target and the second being the control). Its action can be described as:
|x〉|y〉 → |y〉|x⊕ y〉, (2)
and the inverse DCNOT operator can be described as:
|x〉|y〉 → |x⊕ y〉|x〉. (3)
Our quN its |x〉A1 |y〉A2 , with x, y ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}, are arrays of n qubits, and can be written as:
|x1, . . . , xn〉A1,1...A1,n |y1, . . . , yn〉A2,1...A2,n , (4)
where x1 . . . xn and y1 . . . yn are binary representations of x and y, respectively, and Ai,j denote different
qubits (i = 1, 2 and j = 1, 2, . . .N). We define the N -dimensional DCNOT operator by applying the
DCNOT operator on each pair of A1,jA2,j :
|x1, . . . , xn〉A1,1...A1,n |y1, . . . , yn〉A2,1...A2,n → |y1, . . . , yn〉A1,1...A1,n |x1 ⊕ y1, . . . , xn ⊕ yn〉A2,1...A2,n , (5)
that is (A1 = A1,1A1,2 . . . A1,N and analogously for A2),
|x〉A1 |y〉A2 → |y〉A1 |x⊕ y〉A2 . (6)
Analogously, by applying the inverse DCNOT operator on each pair of A1,jA2,j , we have the N -
dimensional inverse DCNOT operator:
|x1, . . . , xn〉A1,1...A1,n |y1, . . . , yn〉A2,1...A2,n → |x1 ⊕ y1, . . . , xn ⊕ yn〉A1,1...A1,n |x1, . . . , xn〉A2,1...A2,n , (7)
that is,
|x〉A1 |y〉A2 → |x⊕ y〉A1 |x〉A2 . (8)
2.2 SDC Protocol 1: using N-dimensional Bell state
Protocol 1 uses the following N -dimensional Bell basis [35], for composite systems of two quN its 1 and
2:
|φ(xy)〉12 = 1√
N
N−1∑
j=0
e
2pii
N
jx|j + y〉1|j〉2, (9)
where x, y ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}. In the rest of the paper, addition and subtraction inside kets are done
modulo N .
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The local (acting onto system 1 only) unitary operators U(xy) transform |φ(00)〉12 into |φ(xy)〉12:(
U(xy)⊗ I
)
|φ(00)〉12 = |φ(xy)〉12, (10)
where U(xy) = XyZx, X : |j〉 −→ |j + 1〉 is the shift operator, and Z : |j〉 −→ e 2piiN j |j〉 is the rotation
operator.
The set {|φ(xy)〉12} forms an orthonormal basis of completely distinguishable states, and for that
reason each of its elements can be used to carry information (xy). The unitary operators U(xy) are then
used to encode that information (xy) into the initial state |φ(00)〉12.
In the initialisation phase of Protocol 1, Alice, Bob and Charlie share two pairs of entangled quN its
|φ(00)〉A1B and |φ(00)〉A2C , where subscripts A1 and A2 denote Alice’s two quN its, subscript B denotes
Bob’s quN it and subscript C denotes Charlie’s quN it. The initial quantum state of the composite system
is (note that for reasons of simplicity, we drop the subscript A1BA2C for Ω-states |Ω(0)〉 etc.)
|Ω(0)〉 = |φ(00)〉A1B ⊗ |φ(00)〉A2C . (11)
Protocol 1 consists of five steps:
(1) Encoding. Alice performs unitary operators U(b1b2) on quN it A1 and U(c1c2) on quN it A2 to
encode (b1, b2) and (c1, c2), respectively, like in the original dense coding scheme [2]. After that, the state
of the composite system becomes
|Ω(1)〉 = UA1(b1b2)⊗ UA2(c1c2)|Ω(0)〉 = |φ(b1b2)〉A1B ⊗ |φ(c1c2)〉A2C . (12)
(2) Locking. Alice performs the DCNOT operator on quN its A1A2 to lock the entanglement channels.
The state of the composite system becomes
|Ω(2)〉 = DCNOTA1A2
(
|φ(b1b2)〉A1B ⊗ |φ(c1c2)〉A2C
)
. (13)
(3) Communication. Alice sends quN it A1 to Bob and quN it A2 to Charlie, like the original dense
coding scheme [2].
(4) Unlocking. Bob and Charlie collaborate to perform the inverse DCNOT operator on quN its
A1A2. The state of the composite system becomes
|Ω(3)〉 = DCNOT †A1A2 |Ω(2)〉 = |φ(b1b2)〉A1B ⊗ |φ(c1c2)〉A2C . (14)
(5) Decoding. Bob and Charlie measure quN its A1B and quN its A2C in the N -dimensional Bell basis
respectively to obtain (b1, b2) and (c1, c2), like the original dense coding scheme [2].
The following theorem demonstrates the validity of Protocol 1.
Theorem 1. Neither Bob nor Charlie alone can learn the encoded information from the states of
their subsystems before step 4 (Unlocking) of Protocol 1.
Proof After step 2 (Locking), the state of the composite system becomes
|Ω(2)〉 =DCNOTA1A2
(
1√
N
N−1∑
j=0
e
2pii
N
jb1 |j + b2〉A1 |j〉B ⊗
1√
N
N−1∑
k=0
e
2pii
N
kc1 |k + c2〉A2 |k〉C
)
=
1
N
N−1∑
j,k=0
e
2pii
N
(jb1+kc1)|k + c2〉A1 |(j + b2)⊕ (k + c2)〉A2 |j〉B|k〉C , (15)
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and the reduced density matrix in subsystem A1B is
ρA1B =
N−1∑
j,k=0
(A2〈j|C〈k|)|Ω(2)〉〈Ω(2)|(|j〉A2 |k〉C)
=
1
N2
N−1∑
j,k=0
|j〉A1 |k〉BA1〈j|B〈k|
= IA1B/N
2. (16)
We can calculate the reduced density matrix in subsystem A2C in the same way and get ρA2C =
IA2C/N
2. Because ρA1B and ρA2C are independent of (b1, b2) and (c1, c2), Bob and Charlie know nothing
about the encoded information before step 4 (Unlocking). 
2.3 SDC Protocol 2: using N-dimensional W state
Li and Qiu [26] presented a sufficient and necessary condition for a N -dimensional W state to be suitable
for perfect teleportation and dense coding, and then they generalised the states of W-class to multi-
particle systems with N -dimension:
|W (00)〉123 = 1√
N
( 1√
2
N−1∑
j=1
|j − 1〉1(|0j〉+ |j0〉)23 + |N − 1〉1|00〉23
)
. (17)
Alice uses unitary operators
U(xy) =
N−1∑
j=0
e
2pii
N
(j−y)x|j − y〉〈j| (18)
to encode her information:
|W (xy)〉123 =
(
U(xy)⊗ I ⊗ I
)
|W (00)〉123, (19)
where x, y ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}.
In the initialisation phase of Protocol 2, Alice, Bob and Charlie share two pairs of entangled quN its
|W (00)〉A1B and |W (00)〉A2C , where subscript A1 and A2 denote Alice’s two quN its, subscript B denotes
Bob’s two quN its and subscript C denotes Charlie’s two quN its. Protocol 2 consists of five steps:
(1) Encoding. Alice performs unitary operators U(b1b2) on quN it A1 and U(c1c2) on quN it A2 to
encode (b1, b2) and (c1, c2), respectively.
(2) Locking. Alice performs the DCNOT operator on quN its A1A2.
(3) Communication. Alice sends quN it A1 to Bob and quN it A2 to Charlie.
(4) Unlocking. Bob and Charlie collaborate to perform the inverse DCNOT operator on quN its
A1A2.
(5) Decoding. Bob and Charlie make the von Neumann measurement using the orthogonal states
{|W (xy)〉} on quN its A1B and quN its A2C, respectively, to obtain (b1, b2) and (c1, c2).
The following theorem demonstrates the validity of Protocol 2.
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Theorem 2. Neither Bob nor Charlie alone can learn the encoded information from the states of
their subsystems before step 4 (Unlocking) of Protocol 2.
Proof The proof is similar to that of Protocol 1. After step 2 (Locking), the reduced density matrix
ρA1B =
1
N2
N−1∑
j=0
|j〉A1 |00〉BA1〈j|B〈00|+
1
2N2
N−1∑
k=1
N−1∑
j=0
|j〉A1(|0k〉+ |k0〉)BA1〈j|B(〈0k|+ 〈k0|)
=
1
N

N−1∑
j=0
|j〉A1〈j|

⊗ 1
N
[
|00〉B〈00|+ 1
2
N−1∑
k=1
(|0k〉+ |k0〉)B(〈0k|+ 〈k0|)
]
, (20)
and analogously for rhoA2C . Because ρA1B and ρA2C are independent of (b1, b2) and (c1, c2), Bob and
Charlie know nothing about the encoded information before step 4 (Unlocking). 
2.4 SDC Protocol 3: using N-dimensional GHZ state
Protocol 3 uses the following N -dimensional GHZ states [4]:
|GHZ(xy)〉123 = 1√
N
N−1∑
j=0
e
2pii
N
jx|j + y〉1|jj〉23, (21)
where x, y ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}.
The unitary operators U(xy) transform |GHZ(00)〉123 into |GHZ(xy)〉123:(
U(xy)⊗ I ⊗ I
)
|GHZ(00)〉123 = |GHZ(xy)〉123, (22)
where U(xy) = XyZx, X : |j〉 −→ |j + 1〉 is the shift operator, Z : |j〉 −→ e 2piiN j |j〉 is the rotation
operator.
Protocol 3 is similar to Protocols 1 and 2, and the proof of its validity is analogous to those of Protocols
1 and 2.
2.5 Other locking operators
In this subsection, we introduce another two locking operators: the quantum Fourier transform and the
SWAP operator.
The two-quN it quantum Fourier transform is defined by
|x〉A1 |y〉A2 →
1
N
N−1∑
j=0
N−1∑
k=0
e
2pii
N2
(xN+y)(jN+k)|j〉A1 |k〉A2 . (23)
The SWAP operator simply swaps two qubits (or quN its):
|ϕ〉A1 |ϕ′〉A2 −→ |ϕ′〉A1 |ϕ〉A2 . (24)
When the N -dimensional quantum Fourier transform or the SWAP operator are substituted for the
DCNOT operator in the above three protocols, the states of Bob’s subsystem and Charlie’s subsystem
after step 2 (Locking) are also independent of (b1, b2) and (c1, c2). Neither Bob nor Charlie alone can
learn the encoded information from the states of their subsystems before step 4 (Unlocking). Only after
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performing the inverse quantum Fourier transform or the SWAP operator together, they can achieve
(b1, b2) and (c1, c2) respectively.
When the SWAP operator is used as the locking operator, Protocols 1-3 become simpler. Step 2
(Locking) can be omitted. In step 3 (Communication), Alice sends quN it A1 to Charlie and quN it A2
to Bob. In step 4 (Unlocking), Bob and Charlie swap quN it A1 and quN it A2. However, if one of the
receivers, say Bob, is malicious, he can fool Charlie in step 4 (Unlocking) by detaining the quN it that
carries (c1, c2) (i.e. quN it A2) and swapping a randomly prepared fake quN it for the quN it that carries
(b1, b2) (i.e. quN it A1). Then, Bob would receive (b1, b2) from quN its A1B, but Charlie would not receive
achieve (c1, c2), because quN it A2 is still at Bob’s side.
3 Improving the fairness of SDC
The clients (Bob and Charlie) can decode the messages only by the joint unlocking quantum operation,
which requires either a quantum channel, shared entanglement, or direct interaction between them. By
“direct interaction”, we mean that the clients meet and input their particles into a physical device that
can unlock the particles, and then get their respective output particles.
In this section, we discuss the problem of achieving a global unlocking operation between the distant
parties (Bob and Charlie) by the means of local operations and classical communication (LOCC), some
prior shared resources (such as entanglement, etc.) and/or quantum communication. Also, we discuss
the problem of the fairness of the protocol, in case the clients do not trust each other. The solution is a
probabilistic protocol based on sequential exchange of information (quantum, or classical with the help
of prior shared entanglement) between the clients.
3.1 The fairness problem
The problem of achieving a global operation by the actions of spatially distant clients (Bob and Charlie)
lies in the fact that the unlocking operation (whether it is the inverse DCNOT, quantum Fourier transform
or SWAP1) has a feature that it can entangle initially separable states. Since it is impossible to create
entanglement by the means of LOCC only, in order to implement the unlocking operation, Bob and
Charlie have to share prior entanglement, or use a quantum channel for one of the clients to send his
quN it to the other, who would then perform the unlocking operation on quN its A1A2 locally (i.e. at his
site).
The problem with any such protocol is that it can be neither simultaneous, nor symmetric, with
respect to the two parties involved, which clearly sets an unfair situation.
This is a general problem that arises within asynchronous distributed networks [36]. Namely, in order
to achieve the joint operation of the quN its A1A2, clients can each perform local measurements, and
then send, conditional to the measurement outcomes, (classical or quantum) information to the other.
Since the clients are far apart, it is impossible to achieve simultaneous message exchange - the messages
are always sent one at a time, from one client to the other (the network is “asynchronous”). This means
that, whatever the protocol that achieves the unlocking operation is, there always exists the last message,
1The case of the SWAP operation is particularly interesting. Namely, after Bob and Charlie swap the states of qubits
A1 and A2, the very qubits do not become entangled with each other. Nevertheless, the distant sites of Bob and Charlie
do become entangled: qubits A1 are now entangled with qubits C, while qubits A2 are entangled with qubits B. The other
way to look at this is through the no-cloning theorem: there is no way for Bob to learn the unknown state of the system
A1B and transfer (swap) its partial state of A1 together with its entanglement with B using only LOCC, without prior
entanglement shared with Charlie.
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say from Bob to Charlie. But this means that, prior to sending his last message to Charlie, Bob has all
the right (quantum) information needed to obtain his message (b1, b2), while Charlie does not. This is
obviously unfair, with respect to Charlie.
3.2 The solution
The situation is similar to the one presented in the contract signing problem [34]. The solution, similar
to the one proposed for quantum contract signing [37], is to perform the unlocking operation on quN its
A1 and A2 (i.e., arrays of qubits A1,1 . . . A1,n and A2,1 . . . A2,n) in series of steps, such that after each
step, one pair of qubits are unlocked. In the course of the unlocking stage, the clients increase their
probabilities to obtain the needed classical information ((b1, b2) and (c1, c2), respectively), such that at
each step one client has slightly higher probability of successful recovery than the other. Therefore, the
protocol is probabilistic, and also fair in the sense that at each step, one client is only slightly privileged
over the other.
The information can be transferred in two equivalent ways: either by sending quantum information
(qubits) via a quantum channel, or by teleporting qubits’ quantum states using LOCC and shared en-
tanglement. Without the loss of generality, we will assume that the clients are exchanging the actual
qubits, rather than teleporting their states. The only difference between the two cases is that in the
latter case, the clients use the previously shared entanglement and exchange classical instead of quantum
information.
The main problem in this approach is that a client, say Charlie, cannot be sure if Bob sent him the
right information or not. Therefore, we introduce additional 2s “control qubits” that are used by the
clients to check each other’s honesty during the unlocking stage: s control qubits would be joined with
n “message qubits” that carry the message (b1, b2), to form (n + s) qubits A1,1 . . . A1,n+s, and given to
Bob; other s control qubits joined with n message qubits that carry (c1, c2), to form A2,1 . . . A2,n+s and
given to Charlie.
The position Cpos1(j) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n+s} of each control qubit j = 1, 2, . . . , s within the (n+s) qubits
A1,1 . . . A1,n+s is chosen randomly by Alice and this information (s integers Cpos1(j)) is given to Bob;
analogously, random positions Cpos2(j) of control qubits from A2,1 . . . A2,n+s are given to Charlie.
The control qubits are prepared by Alice in pure states and are uncorrelated from the message qubits.
The state of each control qubit is randomly chosen by Alice from a publicly known set S of pure states. S is
the union of two mutually unbiased bases, computational Z basis {|0〉, |1〉} and rotatedX basis {|+〉, |−〉},
with |±〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 ± |1〉); therefore, S = {|0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |−〉}. The pure state of j-th control qubit in the
position Cpos1(j) among qubits A1,1 . . . A1,n+s is Cstate1(j), with Cstate1(j) ∈ S. Analogously, the
states of control qubits from A2,1 . . . A2,n+s are encoded by Cstate2(j) ∈ S. Alice gives the information
{Cstate1(j)| j = 1, 2, . . . , s} about the states of control qubits from A1,1 . . . A1,n+s to Bob, and the
information {Cstate2(j)| j = 1, 2, . . . , s} about the states of control qubits from A2,1 . . . A2,n+s to Charlie.
Therefore, prior to Alice sending the message to clients (via sending the qubits A1,1 . . . A1,n+s to Bob
and A2,1 . . . A2,n+s to Charlie), Bob has, apart from quN it B, the information {Cpos1(j)| j = 1, 2, . . . , s}
of the positions and {Cstate1(j)| j = 1, 2, . . . , s} of the the states of the control qubits from A1,1 . . . A1,n+s,
and analogously for Charlie.
During the initialisation phase, Alice, Bob and Charlie share two pairs of entangled quN its, denoted
as
|φ(00)〉A1B ⊗ |φ(00)〉A2C . (25)
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Alice and Bob also share classical information of the control qubits: {Cpos1(j)| j = 1, 2, . . . , s} and
{Cstate1(j)| j = 1, 2, . . . , s}. Alice and Charlie also share classical information {Cpos2(j)| j = 1, 2, . . . , s}
and {Cstate2(j)| j = 1, 2, . . . , s}.
The protocol of simultaneous dense coding of classical messages (b1, b2) and (c1, c2) works as follows:
(1) Encoding. Alice performs unitary operators U(b1b2) on quN it A1 and U(c1c2) on quN it A2 to
encode (b1, b2) and (c1, c2), respectively.
(2) Locking. Alice joins the s control qubits with nmessage qubits A1,1 . . . A1,n, to form the ordered set
of (n+s) qubits A1,1 . . . A1,n+s. The j-th control qubit is prepared in Cstate1(j) ∈ S and is in the position
Cpos1(j), while the relative positions of the n message qubits are the same as before. Analogously, she
forms the set A2,1 . . . A2,n+s.
For j = 1 to n+ s, Alice applies the locking operator on A1,jA2,j .
(3) Communication. Alice sends (n+s) qubits A1,1 . . . A1,n+s to Bob, and (n+s) qubits A2,1 . . . A2,n+s
to Charlie.
(4) Unlocking. For j = 1 to n+ s, Bob sends qubit A1,j to Charlie, and then Charlie returns A1,j to
Bob after performing the unlocking operator on A1,jA2,j at his site.
If ∃k, Cpos1(k) = j (i.e., if the j-th qubit given to Bob is a controlled one), Bob measures A1,j in
either X or Z basis, according to Cstate1(k). If the measurement result does not match Cstate1(k), he
knows that Charlie did not return the real A1,j and stops the unlocking stage.
Analogously, if ∃k, Cpos2(k) = j, Charlie measuresA2,j in eitherX or Z basis, according to Cstate2(k).
If the measurement result does not match Cstate2(k), he knows that Bob did not send the real A1,j and
stops the unlocking stage.
The remaining n qubits received at Bob’s site form the ordered set A1,1 . . . A1,n, and the remaining n
qubits received at Charlie’s site form the ordered set A2,1 . . . A2,n.
(5) Decoding. Bob and Charlie measure quN its A1B and quN its A2C in the Bell basis respectively
to achieve (b1, b2) and (c1, c2).
The unlocking of qubits A1,1 . . . A1,n+s and A2,1 . . . A2,n+s is done in (n + s) steps, such that in
each step one pair of qubits is unlocked. The order of qubits must be maintained. Without the loss of
generality, we assume that the unlocking operation is done at Charlie’s site. We will assume that Bob
is an honest client who sends qubits A1,1 . . . A1,n+s to Charlie, as long as he is convinced that Charlie is
returning the exact resulting qubit after the local unlocking operation at Charlie’s site. The way to check
if Charlie is indeed doing so is the following: in each step Cpos1(j) of the unlocking stage (i.e., when the
qubit given by Alice to Bob is a controlled one), Bob measures the state of the qubit received back from
Charlie during that step in one of the two mutually unbiased bases – Z if Cstate1(j) is in {|0〉, |1〉}, X
otherwise. If the measurement result matches the classical information Cstate1(j), i.e. if Bob’s outcome
is consistent with Charlie returning the control qubit in Cstate1(j), Bob continues with the unlocking
stage. Otherwise, it means that Charlie did not return the control qubit in Cstate1(j) and Bob stops
the unlocking stage. Since Charlie does not know the positions of control qubits from A1,1 . . . A1,n+s,
he has to return all of the resulting qubits to Bob. Otherwise, he will inevitably return some qubits as
control ones in states different from those prepared by Alice, and Bob will, with high probability, be able
to detect it.
Note that the whole analysis is done for the ideal case where no measurement errors or decoherence
effects occur. The existence of measurement errors will set the threshold value η > 0 for the allowed
number of wrong results obtained on control qubits (results inconsistent with Charlie sending the control
qubits in Cstate1(j)), which will increase the number s of the control qubits. After receiving, in the
course of exchange, k ≤ s controlled qubits, we require that not more than ηk wrong results are obtained.
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The parameter η is determined by the experimental set-up, which sets the probability of obtaining the
wrong result when the right qubit is sent.
The protocol is optimistic [38]: if both clients are honest, if they execute the protocol by unlocking the
qubits Alice gave them, upon finishing the unlocking stage both parties will have the whole information
sent by Alice.
Unfortunately, if we insist on the perfect fidelity of data transmission, situations when one client (say
Charlie) knows that he obtained the whole information, while the other hasn’t, clearly puts Bob in a
disadvantaged situation. For example, if the unlocking operation is done at Charlie’s site, Charlie can
decide not to return the last resulting qubit to Bob, which would leave him without the whole state
|φ(b1b2)〉A1B, and thus (b1, b2), in case Cpos1(s) < n + s. The perfect fidelity was for the same reasons
relaxed for quantum contract signing as well, by introducing the factor α < 1 of the required fraction of
correct results for the total number N of qubits sent to a client [37]. Therefore, we will also introduce
factor α < 1 and require that a client has correct values of α(2n) message bits sent to him by Alice.
The above protocol is clearly probabilistic. At each step of the unlocking stage, Bob has a finite
probability, which increases with the execution of the protocol, to obtain correct values of 2αn bits of the
message (b1, b2) that Alice sent him, and analogously for Charlie.
Due to its probabilistic nature, during the execution of the protocol one client is always privileged
over the other. By privileged, we mean that one client has higher probability of obtaining the required
fraction α of the message Alice encoded for him, than the other. The difference between the clients’
probabilities to obtain the information sent by Alice is due to the random distribution of control qubits.
On the other side, since neither of the clients know the distribution of both sets of control qubits, even
though one of them might be privileged over the other at a certain step of the unlocking stage, he would
not know that: the protocol is a priori symmetric with respect to the clients.
Yet, the protocol is fair [39]: throughout the execution, one client is only slightly privileged over the
other, the difference being smaller with the increase of s and could be made arbitrarily small for big
enough s. The argument here is exactly the same as the one presented for the fairness of the quantum
contract signing protocol [37].
Namely, the role of the control qubits is to signal possible cheating of a client. By cheating, we
mean not sending the qubits received by Alice. For example, if one of the clients, say Charlie, starts
sending qubits each randomly in one of four states {|0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |−〉}, he will send wrong message qubits
A1 sent by Alice, but also wrong control qubits. Therefore, for each control qubit he will have a finite
probability of 1/2 of being detected cheating (he did not send the right control qubit). Therefore, since
Bob’s probability pw to detect a wrong qubit (Charlie’s cheating) is approaching to one exponentially
fast, pw = 1− (1/2)m, where m is a number of controlled qubits that are sent as random, it is not difficult
to estimate the expected difference between Bob and Charlie, depending on the total number n of the
message qubits to be sent from one client to another and the number s of the controlled qubits given to
each client.
One simply has to estimate the expected value for m, the expected number 〈m〉 of wrongly sent
control qubits after which Bob notices the cheating and stops communication. During that time, Bob
received certain number w of random qubits as the message qubits, while Charlie was still receiving the
proper ones. Therefore, he is in advantage by having about w/2 more correct values for message bits
(even when guessing bit values at random, one has 1/2 of the probability to be correct). The value w is
a simple function of m, w = w(m), and the dependence on m can be straightforwardly determined by n
and s. For big enough n, w(〈m〉) << n and therefore Charlie’s advantage is negligible.
Of course, Charlie can try to send qubits in some other states (completely random, etc.), but as
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long as he’s not sending the right qubits in the right states, there will be a finite probability p > 0
that Bob detects cheating in a single-shot measurement, so that his probability to detect cheating will
again exponentially fast approach to one in the number of wrongly sent control qubits, making Charlie’s
privilege arbitrarily small, for big enough n. Charlie can try to decrease the value of p, but can never
make it zero. Otherwise, he would be able to perfectly distinguish between the non-orthogonal states
and this would violate the security of the BB84 cryptographic protocol [40], for example.
In the case of quantum contract signing [37] the role of message and control qubits was given to
the same N qubits sent by a trusted party (in our case Alice) to clients (in our case Bob and Charlie),
while in the case of simultaneous dense coding the two roles are given to separate sets of qubits. This will
introduce a slight change in the expressions for the probabilities involved in calculation, but this change is
minor, conceptually straightforward to calculate and does not affect the main result of protocol’s fairness.
Nevertheless, knowing the exact expressions for the probabilities in case of different cheating strategies
is of crucial importance, and may technically be quite non-trivial, which clearly presents interesting and
challenging topics for future research.
The fairness condition can be even straightened, as was done in [37], by requiring the negligible
probability to cheat: the probability that one client has 2αn right bits, while the other does not. This
quantity may be quite relevant in various possible scenarios, like in the case of signing contracts for buying
and selling the goods on the market (see [37]). While for a fixed value of α the probability to cheat may
be as high as 1/4, if it is unknown to the clients and chosen randomly by Alice from a certain interval
Iα ⊂ (1/2, 1), the probability to cheat can be made as small as needed, for big enough n (see [37]).
The locking and unlocking operators performed on two quN its (i.e., two arrays of qubits) in this
section are actually products of two-qubit locking and unlocking operators. The N -dimensional DCNOT
operator and the SWAP operator are of this kind. But the N -dimensional quantum Fourier transform
cannot be done qubit(pair)-by-qubit(pair). Therefore, the quantum Fourier transform cannot be used to
implement the SDC protocol proposed in this section.
4 Improving the security of SDC
We now consider the security of simultaneous dense coding. We assume that in the initialisation phase,
the entangled pairs have been securely distributed among Alice, Bob and Charlie. Because only part of
the entangled pairs travel through the quantum channel, an outsider knows nothing about the encoded
information. If the two receivers are honest and follow the protocols exactly, they must collaborate to
achieve their respective information. However, if one of the receivers, say Bob, is dishonest and has the
ability to intercept and resend the qubits going through the quantum channel between Alice and Charlie,
he can obtain (b1, b2) without collaborating with Charlie by the following intercept-resend attack: (1)
intercept quN it A2; (2) perform the unlocking operation on quN its A1A2; (3) measure quN its A1B to
obtain (b1, b2); (4) perform the locking operation on quN its A1A2; (5) send quN it A2 back to Charlie.
To detect such a cheating behaviour, we insert additional 2r “detect qubits” into the array of 2n
message qubits during the communication phase: r detect qubits would be joined with n message qubits
that carry the message (b1, b2), to form (n + r) qubits A1,1 . . . A1,n+r, and given to Bob; other r detect
qubits joined with n message qubits that carry (c1, c2), to form A2,1 . . . A2,n+r and given to Charlie.
The position Dpos1(j) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n+ r} of each detect qubit j = 1, 2, . . . , r within the (n+ r) qubits
A1,1 . . . A1,n+r is chosen randomly by Alice, and analogously for Dpos2(j) of each detect qubit within
A2,1 . . . A2,n+r.
The state of each detect qubit is randomly chosen by Alice from set S = Z ∪X = {|0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |−〉}.
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Table 1: Comparison between different protocols
Protocol Properties Extra cost
protocol in Sec. 2 and Ref. [33]
protocol in Sec. 3 fair s control qubits
protocol in Sec. 4 secure r detect qubits
protocol in Appendix fair, secure s control qubits +r detect qubits
The pure state of j-th detect qubit in the position Dpos1(j) among qubits A1,1 . . . A1,n+r is Dstate1(j),
with Dstate1(j) ∈ S. Analogously, the states of detect qubits from A2,1 . . . A2,n+r are encoded by
Dstate2(j) ∈ S.
Only after the transmission of all the message qubits and detect qubits, Alice tells Bob and Charlie the
positions and the bases of the detect qubits and requires them to return the results of the measurements
performed on the detect qubits. Therefore Alice can check if after the transmission the states of the
detect qubits have been altered by a dishonest client.
Because the position of the detect qubits in the array are chosen randomly by Alice, curious Bob does
not know which qubits are the message qubits. If his intercept-resend attack involves a detect qubit, the
state of the detect qubit may probably be changed, the probability of being detected grows exponentially
with the increase of r and could be made arbitrarily large for big enough r.
During the initialisation phase, Alice, Bob and Charlie share two pairs of entangled quN its, denoted
as
|φ(00)〉A1B ⊗ |φ(00)〉A2C . (26)
The protocol of simultaneous dense coding of classical messages (b1, b2) and (c1, c2) works similarly
as in the previous case. For completeness, in A we present a detailed description of the combination of
the two strategies that assure fair and secure simultaneous dense coding protocol.
We summarise the above protocols in Table 1 in order to demonstrate their qualitative and quantitative
differences. The original SDC protocol in [33] and the N -dimensional SDC protocol in Sec. 2 are
vulnerable to intercept-resend attacks and require the receivers to perform the unlocking operation at
the same site, otherwise the fairness problem arises. The improved SDC protocol in Sec. 3 can guarantee
fairness in the unlocking phase even if the receivers are separated spatially, by implementing the unlocking
operation in series of steps of communication and introducing additional control qubits for cheat detection.
On the other hand, the improved SDC protocol in Sec. 4 can guarantee security against the intercept-
resend attack in the communication phase, by introducing additional detect qubits in the communication
phase. The protocol in Appendix incorporates both fairness and security properties. We can also see
from the table that the cost of the protocol increase with these improvements.
5 Applications to contract signing
Contract signing [34] is a security task involving two parties, Charlie and Bob, that do not trust each
other and want to exchange a common contract signed with each other’s signature. At the end of the
protocol Charlie should have the contract signed by Bob and vice-versa. The purpose of the signed
contract is to bind the parties to the terms of the contract, which can be enforced by a judge (Alice). The
real challenge to this problem is when both Charlie and Bob are physically apart and want to remotely
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sign the contract. This situation is becoming more and more common due to e-business, and may lead
to fraud. For instance, if Bob gets the contract signed by Charlie without committing himself, Charlie
and Bob are in an unfair situation. By having Charlie’s commitment, Bob is able to appeal to Alice to
enforce the contract, while Charlie has no means to do the same, since he does not possess the contract
signed by Bob. Note that even if Bob did not commit, but having Charlie’s commitment, puts him in a
position to later in time choose whether to bind the contract or not, while Charlie has no power to do
either of the two.
A simple solution to this unfair situation is to have a trusted third party (again Alice) mediating
the transaction – Bob sends to Alice the contract signed by him and Charlie does the same; then Alice
exchanges the contracts only after she has received both of the commitments. Note that this procedure
increases significantly the cost of remote contract signing, as Alice’s time and resources are expensive.
What is particularly costly is Alice being constantly online and alert waiting for the clients to contact her.
Also, avoiding the communication with the trusted party at the very moment of determining a contract
and committing to it removes the danger of overloading Alice and creating a bottleneck.
Unfortunately, it has been shown that the attendance of Alice is mandatory [34, 36], if the protocol
is to fulfil the following two important properties:
• fairness: either both parties get each other’ commitment or none gets;
• viability: if both parties behave honestly, they will both get each other’s commitments.
One way to overcome this difficulty is to consider optimistic protocols that do not require communi-
cation with Alice unless something wrong comes up [38]. Another workaround is to relax the fairness
condition, allowing one agent to have ǫ more probability of binding the contract than the other agent
(probabilistic fairness). In this case, for an arbitrary small ǫ solutions have been found where the number
of exchanged messages between the agents is minimised [39].
In this section we present a probabilistically fair quantum protocol based on a secure SDC for remote
agents, such as the one described in A (a combination of protocols presented in Section 3.2 and Section 4).
In such protocol, Alice, the trusted party, does not interact with the signing parties while they (Bob and
Charlie) are determining the contract and then committing to it (the Exchange Phase). Note that in
the below construction of a contract signing scheme, a SDC protocol is used iteratively many times as a
black box. Thus, any protocol that achieves simultaneous transmission of (densly) coded information that
satisfies the fairness and the security conditions, as presented in Section 3 and Section 4, respectively,
allows for constructing probabilistically fair contract signing scheme.
In order to lower the use of resources, it is possible to map long contracts into messages of a small
fixed size, say of k bits. Such short messages (digests) are obtained by so called hash functions (such as
SHA1) and are well established in the field of cryptography [41]. Hash functions are not injective, that is,
there exist pairs of different messages x, x′ with the same digest d. Nevertheless, given a message x and
its digest d, it is computationally hard to find a different message x′ 6= x with the same digest d. For this
reason, digests can be used to identify a message. From this point on, instead of contracts themselves we
consider their digests, obtained by some hash function, with k bits, say (b1 . . . bk), where bi ∈ {0, 1}.
We also assume that Alice can sign messages using some public key signing scheme (such as DSS, for
more detail see [41]). In short, a public key signature scheme for Alice is a pair of functions (sig, ver)
together with a pair of keys (A, Aˆ) where A is the private key of Alice (known only by Alice) and Aˆ is
the corresponding public key (known by Alice, Bob and Charlie). For Alice to sign a message m, she uses
her private key A and obtains the signature sigA(m). Bob (or Charlie) verifies if sigA(m) is the message
m signed by Alice by checking whether ver
Aˆ
(m, sigA(m)) = 1. If verAˆ(m, sigA(m)) 6= 1 then sigA(m)
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does not correspond to the signature of Alice over m. Signing can be seen as an encryption, unique to
Alice: only she can do it using her private key A. But Bob and Charlie can, given the message m and a
signature s, by using Alice’s public key Aˆ verify whether s is indeed the signature of m by Alice or not.
In our contract signing protocol, Alice does not know a priori to which particular contract/digest
(b1 . . . bk) Bob and Charlie are going to agree upon. However, at the end of the protocol Alice (and also
Bob and Charlie) needs some irrefutable proof of the particular contract that was agreed upon. Moreover,
we do not want Alice to be contacted during the exchange phase. A solution for this problem is for Alice
to produce 4k triples {(b, i,Bob), (b, i,Charlie) : b ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1 . . . k} that can be used to represent any
particular contract (b1 . . . bk) that Bob and Charlie will agree upon latter. Next, Alice signs those 4k
triples and prepares 2k SDC protocols for Bob and Charlie, where in each of these SDC protocols the
messages to be simultaneously received are sigA(b, i,Charlie) by Bob and sigA(b, i,Bob) by Charlie, with
b ∈ {0, 1} and i ∈ {1 . . . k}.
Thus, Bob can enforce the contract (b1 . . . bk) against Charlie (and no other person) if he shows to
Alice the signatures sigA(b1, 1,Charlie) . . . sigA(bk, k,Charlie). By using SDC, it is possible to force Bob
to obtain this information (and no other) only with the collaboration of Charlie, and vice-versa. In detail
the contract signing protocol based on SDC works as follows:
Initialization Phase:
1. Alice signs the following 4k messages: (0, i,Bob), (1, i,Bob), (0, i,Charlie), (1, i,Charlie) with i =
1, 2, . . . , k.
2. Alice arranges for 2k different SDC’s for the case of distant parties such that the message to be sent
to Bob in one of such SDC’s is sigA(b, i,Charlie) and to Charlie is sigA(b, i,Bob) for i = 1, 2, . . . , k and
b = 0, 1.
Exchange Phase:
1. Bob and Charlie agree on contract (b1 . . . bk) ∈ {0, 1}k.
2. For i = 1 to k, Bob and Charlie collaborate to obtain from the entangled quNits of the 2k SDC’s the
messages sigA(bi, i,Charlie) and sigA(bi, i,Bob), respectively, and ignore the remaining quantum data
sent by Alice. Thus, at the end of the SDC’s Bob has sigA(bi, i,Charlie), for i = 1 . . . k, and mutatis
mutandis for Charlie.
Binding Phase:
1. Alice enforces contract (b1 . . . bk) when either Bob presents sigA(b1, 1,Charlie) . . . sigA(bk, k,Charlie)
or Charlie presents sigA(b1, 1,Bob) . . . sigA(bk, k,Bob).
The size of each signature, say sigA(bi, i,Charlie), is given by the length of a message a client receives
in each SDC, which is 2n bits (the factor 2 comes from the fact that the coding is dense). Since each
SDC is probabilistic, a client only needs to present to Alice αi(2n) bits, with
1
2 < αi < 1, of the signature
sigA(bi, i,Charlie) for each i = 1 . . . k. Moreover, if each αi is random we achieve even stronger fairness
condition, namely the expected probability to cheat on each SDC can be made arbitrarily small (the
probability to cheat is the probability that an agent obtains at least αi(2n) bits of a signature and the
other does not [37]).
The contract signing protocol described above, unlike the one presented in [37], allows for Bob and
Charlie to determine the contract after the Initialisation Phase. This is due to the fact that public key
15
signatures were introduced. However, this introduction leads to a poorer security assumption, as public
key signatures are only computationally secure (as well as hash functions).
We can improve the security of the above protocol by removing both hash functions and public key
signatures. Removing hash function accounts to consider a large enough k such that all potential contracts
by Bob and Charlie would fit in k bits. To remove public key signatures, which are not perfectly secure,
Alice can, during the initialisation phase, share a symmetric key kAB with Bob and another, kAC , with
Charlie. These symmetric keys might be made perfectly secure by using one-time pad cryptosystems (see,
for example [41]). Then, in each SDC the message that Bob receives is kAB(bi, i, ri(bi)) and the message
that Charlie receives is kAC(bi, i, ri(bi)). Here, kAB(m) is the encryption of m with the symmetric key
kAB and ri(bi) is a random string for each i and bi, sampled and known only by Alice, that is associated
to a contract between Bob and Charlie. So, for Bob to enforce contract (b1 . . . bk) against Charlie, he has
to present to Alice the random numbers r1(b1) . . . rk(bk). Note that in this case Alice has to store all these
random numbers ri(bi) in her private memory keeping in mind to whom they are associated. In this way
the protocol’s perfect security is obtained by the laws of physics, which is stronger than computational
security used in classical protocols.
6 N-dimensional simultaneous teleportation
Dense coding and quantum teleportation are dual protocols intimately linked to each other, both in
their purpose as well as in the construction. The former is used to transmit (densely coded) classical
information, while the latter transfers quantum states (i.e., quantum information). In Introduction, as a
motivation for SDC the following situation was described: an agent, say a boss of a company, needs for two
employees to simultaneously carry out two different confidential tasks, such that each employee is unaware
of the other’s activity. SDC allows that the two tasks, encoded by classical information, are confidentially
communicated to the employees. Similarly, one could imagine a situation in which the employees are
requested to each execute a predetermined quantum protocol (say, a quantum computation algorithm)
for a given confidential initial state. The solution for such situation is achieved by a simultaneous
teleportation protocol.
Simultaneous teleportation was proposed by Wang et al [32], in which all the receivers simultaneously
obtain their respective quantum states from the sender. In their scheme, the sender first performs a
locking operation to entangle the particles from two independent quantum entanglement channels, and
therefore the receivers cannot restore their quantum states separately before performing the unlocking
operation together. The locking operator is composed of the Hadamard and the CNOT operators.
Ref. [33] showed that the quantum Fourier transform can alternatively be used as the locking operator
in simultaneous teleportation. In this section, we further investigate simultaneous teleportation of quN its
using the N -dimensional quantum Fourier transform.
In the task ofN -dimensional simultaneous teleportation, Alice intends to teleport the unknown quN its
|ϕt〉Tt =
∑N−1
s=0 αt,s|s〉Tt to Bobt (1 ≤ t ≤M) under the condition that all the receivers must collaborate
to simultaneously obtain |ϕt〉Tt .
In the initialisation phase, Alice shares with each Bobt a pair of entangled quN its |φ(00)〉AtBt , where
subscript At denotes Alice’s quN it, and subscript Bt denotes Bobt’s quN it. The initial quantum state
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of the composite system is
|χ(0)〉 =
M⊗
t=1
|φ(00)〉AtBt
M⊗
t=1
|ϕt〉Tt
=
1√
NM
NM−1∑
j=0
|j〉A1...AM |j〉B1...BM
M⊗
t=1
|ϕt〉Tt , (27)
where j is a base-N -number which can be written as j1j2 . . . jM , jt ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}.
The protocol for simultaneous teleportation of quN its consists of five steps:
(1) Locking. Alice performs the N -dimensional quantum Fourier transform
|j〉A1...AM −→
1√
NM
NM−1∑
k=0
e
2pii
NM
jk|k〉A1...AM (28)
on quN its A1 . . . AM to lock the entanglement channels. After that, the state of the composite system
becomes
|χ(1)〉 = 1√
NM
NM−1∑
j=0
QFTA1...AM |j〉A1...AM |j〉B1...BM
M⊗
t=1
|ϕt〉Tt
=
1√
NM
NM−1∑
j=0
1√
NM
NM−1∑
k=0
e
2pii
NM
jk|k〉A1...AM |j〉B1...BM
M⊗
t=1
|ϕt〉Tt . (29)
(2) Measuring. Alice measures each pair of quN its AtTt in the N -dimensional Bell basis.
M⊗
t=1
AtTt〈φ(xtyt)|χ(1)〉
=
1
NM
(
M⊗
t=1
N−1∑
j=0
e−
2pii
N
jxt
At〈j + yt|Tt〈j|
)
[
NM−1∑
k=0
( M⊗
t=1
|kt〉At |ϕt〉Tt
) 1√
NM
NM−1∑
j=0
e
2pii
NM
jk|j〉B1...BM
]
=
1
NM
NM−1∑
k=0
(
M∏
t=1
N−1∑
j=0
e−
2pii
N
jxt〈j + yt|kt〉〈j|
N−1∑
s=0
αt,s|s〉
)
QFTB1...BM |k〉B1...BM
=
1
NM
QFTB1...BM
NM−1∑
k=0
M⊗
t=1
e−
2pii
N
xt(kt−yt)αt,kt−yt |kt〉Bt
=
1
NM
QFTB1...BM
NM−1∑
k=0
M⊗
t=1
e−
2pii
N
xtktαt,kt |kt + yt〉Bt
=
1
NM
QFTB1...BM
NM−1∑
k=0
M⊗
t=1
αt,ktX
yt(Z†)xt |kt〉Bt
=
1
NM
QFTB1...BM
M⊗
t=1
Xyt(Z†)xt
N−1∑
s=0
αt,s|s〉Bt , (30)
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where X : |j〉 −→ |j + 1〉 is the shift operator, Z : |j〉 −→ e 2piiN j |j〉 is the rotation operator.
If the measurement result of quN its AtTt is |φ(xtyt)〉, the state of quN its B1 . . . BM collapses into
|χ(2)〉 = QFTB1...BM
M⊗
t=1
Xyt(Z†)xt |ϕt〉Bt . (31)
(3) Communication. Alice sends the measurement result (xt, yt) to each Bobt.
(4) Unlocking. All the receivers collaborate to perform the inverse quantum Fourier transform on
quN its B1 . . . BM , and the state of quN its B1 . . . BM becomes
|χ(3)〉 = QFT †B1...BM |χ(2)〉 =
M⊗
t=1
Xyt(Z†)xt |ϕt〉Bt . (32)
(5) Recovering. Each Bobt performs Z
xt(X†)yt on quN it Bt to obtain |ϕt〉.
7 Conclusions
Dense coding [2] and teleportation [35] are important quantum communication tasks. Simultaneous
dense coding [33] and simultaneous teleportation [32], which guarantee that the receivers simultaneously
achieve their respective information from one sender, may be relevant and useful for improvement of
some models or tasks of quantum communication. In this paper, we have given a number of new results
on simultaneous dense coding and teleportation. More specifically, we have given three protocols for
simultaneous dense coding utilising different N -dimensional quantum states (i.e., Bell state, W state,
and GHZ state). Besides the quantum Fourier transform, we have introduced two new locking operators
(i.e. the double controlled-NOT operator and the SWAP operator) for simultaneous dense coding. Then
we have analysed the fairness and the security of the simultaneous dense coding protocol and proposed a
protocol which guarantees both the fairness and the security, thus allowing for mutually distant receivers
to execute the protocol. We have shown that any fair simultaneous dense coding scheme that is secure
against intercept-resend attack can be used to implement a fair contract signing protocol. In addition,
we have shown that the N -dimensional quantum Fourier transform can act as the locking operator in
simultaneous teleportation of quN its.
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A Combination of the two strategies
In this appendix, we combine in one protocol the two strategies described in the above two sections:
(i) if Bob and Charlie have the ability to intercept and resend the qubits going through the quantum
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channel, Alice can detect such behaviour and interrupt the protocol; (ii) if Bob and Charlie are spatially
separated, they can fairly decode their respective messages simultaneously through communication.
In the initialisation phase, Alice, Bob and Charlie share two pair of entangled quN its, denoted as
|φ(00)〉A1B ⊗ |φ(00)〉A2C . (33)
Alice and Bob also share classical information of the control qubits: {Cpos1(j)| j = 1, 2, . . . , s} and
{Cstate1(j)| j = 1, 2, . . . , s}. Alice and Charlie also share classical information {Cpos2(j)| j = 1, 2, . . . , s}
and {Cstae2(j)| j = 1, 2, . . . , s}.
The protocol of simultaneous dense coding of classical messages (b1, b2) and (c1, c2) works as follows:
(1) Encoding. Alice performs unitary operators U(b1b2) on quN it A1 and U(c1c2) on quN it A2 to
encode (b1, b2) and (c1, c2), respectively.
(2) Locking. Alice joins the s control qubits with nmessage qubits A1,1 . . . A1,n, to form the ordered set
of (n+s) qubits A1,1 . . . A1,n+s. The j-th control qubit is prepared in Cstate1(j) ∈ S and is in the position
Cpos1(j), while the relative positions of the n message qubits are the same as before. Analogously, she
forms the set A2,1 . . . A2,n+s.
For j = 1 to n+ s, Alice applies the locking operator on qubits A1,jA2,j .
(3) Communication. Alice joins the r detect qubits with (n+ s) message and control qubits A1,1 . . .
A1,n+s, to form the ordered set of (n+ s+ r) qubits A1,1 . . . A1,n+s+r. The j-th detect qubit is prepared
in Dstate1(j) ∈ S and is in the position Dpos1(j), while the relative positions of the remaining (n + s)
qubits are the same as before. Analogously, she forms the set A2,1 . . . A2,n+s+r .
Alice sends (n + s + r) qubits A1,1 . . . A1,n+s+r to Bob, and (n + s + r) qubits A2,1 . . . A2,n+s+r to
Charlie.
Alice waits for Bob and Charlie’s acknowledgements of receiving all the 2(n+s+r) qubits. After they
have sent their acknowledgements through unjammable classical communication channel, Alice sends
{Dpos1(j)| j = 1, 2, . . . , r} and the bases of {Dstate1(j)| j = 1, 2, . . . , r} to Bob. Analogously, Alice
sends {Dpos2(j)| j = 1, 2, . . . , r} and the bases of {Dstate2(j)| j = 1, 2, . . . , r} to Charlie.
For each j = Dpos1(k), Bob measures qubit A1,j in either X or Z basis, according to Dstate1(k),
and returns the measurement result to Alice. If the measurement result is not equal to Dstate1(k), Alice
announces that a cheating behaviour has been detected and stops the protocol.
Analogously, for each j = Dpos2(k), Charlie measures qubit A2,j in either X or Z basis, according
to Dstate2(k), and returns the measurement result to Alice. If the measurement result is not equal to
Dstate2(k), Alice announces that a cheating behaviour has been detected and stops the protocol.
Now the remaining (n+ s) received qubits at Bob’s site form the ordered set A1,1 . . . A1,n+s, and the
remaining (n+ s) received qubits at Charlie’s site form the ordered set A2,1 . . . A2,n+s.
(4) Unlocking. For j = 1 to n+ s, Bob sends qubit A1,j to Charlie, and then Charlie returns A1,j to
Bob after performing the unlocking operator on qubits A1,jA2,j at his site.
If ∃k, Cpos1(k) = j, Bob measures qubit A1,j in either X or Z basis, according to Cstate1(k). If the
measurement result does not match Cstate1(k), he knows that Charlie did not return the real A1,j and
stops the unlocking stage.
Analogously, if ∃k, Cpos2(k) = j, Charlie measures qubit A2,j in either X or Z basis, according to
Cstate2(k). If the measurement result does not match Cstate2(k), he knows that Bob did not send the
real A1,j and stops the unlocking stage.
Now the remaining n received qubits at Bob’s site form the ordered set A1,1 . . . A1,n, and the remaining
n received qubits at Charlie’s site form the ordered set A2,1 . . . A2,n.
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(5) Decoding. Bob and Charlie measure quN its A1B and quN its A2C in the Bell basis respectively
to achieve (b1, b2) and (c1, c2).
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